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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jace Thompson appeals, challenging the district court's decision to revoke his
probation, or alternatively, its failure to reduce his sentences sua sponte when it did so,
following his guilty plea to eluding and burglary. However, his request to augment the
appellate record with several relevant transcripts was denied, in what Mr. Thompson
contends is a violation of his constitutional rights.
The State's response relies primarily on the Court of Appeals' decision in State v.
Morgan,-··~ Idaho_, 288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012), rev. denied. However, under the

specific facts of this case, Morgan is inapplicable, and even if it were applicable, it would
still require that the requested transcripts be augmented to the record. As such, the
State's reliance on Morgan is misplaced.

The State's only other contentions are

procedural in nature, ignoring the fact that adherence to a procedural rule does not
shield the State in light of a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.
Additionally, the rules the State promotes would result in a waste of judicial resources,
particularly in this case, where the relevance of the transcripts to the district court's
decision to revoke probation was clear, as those transcripts were mistakenly transcribed
and provided to appellate counsel.

As such, the State's argument fails and

Mr. Thompson should be afforded appropriate relief.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Thompson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Thompson due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motions to Augment the record with various
transcripts from the prior proceedings of his cases, and which contained
information relevant to his appeal.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Thompson's
probation or, alternatively, by not reducing his sentence sua sponte pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35.

3

ARGUIVIENT

I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Thompson Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motions To Augment The Record With Various
Transcripts From The Prior Proceedings Of His Cases, And Which Contained
Information Relevant To His Appeal

A.

Introduction
Mr. Thompson argues that, by denying his motions to augment the record with

transcripts of trial proceedings relevant to the issues he intends to raise on appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process of law, equal protection under the law,
and effective assistance of counsel.

The State responds with several attempted

justifications of that decision, most of which rest on the Court of Appeals' decision in

Morgan, even though that case is not applicable to Mr. Thompson's claims, and even if
it were, that decision still mandates augmentation based on the particular facts of
Mr. Thompson's case. Its remaining contentions are procedural in nature (for example,
Mr. Thompson could have proceeded under I.AR. 29(a) rather than I.AR. 30, or he
should have presented that evidence again at one of the hearings which were
transcribed), rules which do not justify violating the Constitution and which would result
in a waste of judicial resources. As such, the State has provided no viable justification
for the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions, which violated Mr. Thompson's constitutional
rights. Therefore, because his rights were violated, this Court should afford him relief.

B.

The Failure To Augment The Appellate Record With The Relevant Transcripts
Violated Mr. Thompson's Constitutional Rights
The decision in Morgan is inapplicable to Mr. Thompson's case because the

shortfall identified by the Court of Appeals in Morgan was that the defendant had not
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made a sufficient showing of the necessity of the requested transcript.
288 P.3d at 838.

Morgan,

However, in this case, because those hearings were mistakenly

transcribed and those transcripts were provided to appellate counsel, Mr. Thompson did
show the necessity of having them augmented to his appellate record. (See Renewed
Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support
Thereof (hereinafter, Renewed Motion), filed June 22, 2012.)

For example, they

contained statements of allocution, which are always relevant to excessive sentence
claims because, by their nature, statements of allocution present evidence of mitigation,
such as statements of remorse and acceptance of responsibility.

See, e.g.,

State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816-17 (Ct. App. 2003).

Even though Gervasi speaks in terms of excessive sentences, both excessive
sentence and erroneous revocation claims are reviewed by essentially the same
standards, and therefore statements of allocution are relevant to the decision to
relinquish jurisdiction. Compare State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000)
(discussing the standard of review for an erroneous revocation claim, which is whether
probation is consistent with the protection of society), with State v. Charboneau, 124
Idaho 497, 500 (1993) (discussing the standard of review for an excessive sentence
claim, which is whether the sentence serves the sentencing objectives, the paramount
of which is to ensure the protection of society). In both situations, the appellate court
looks to the same factors, which include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good
character, status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and
amenability to treatment, and support of family." State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320
(2006); see also Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts,
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121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, n4 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App.
·J 988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho

593, 595 (1982). Furthermore, the appellate courts have, when reviewing a decision to
revoke probation, "examine[d] the entire record encompassing events before and after
the original judgment." 1 State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989). As
such, these transcripts, which contain clearly relevant and necessary information
germane to the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Thompson's probation, needed to
be augmented to the record, or else Mr. Thompson is denied due process of law and
equal protection under the law.

2

(See App. Br., pp.10-14.)

1

The Court of Appeals has subsequently determined that the term "the entire record" is
actually limited, and "does not mean that a// proceedings in the trial court up to and
including sentencing are germane. The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying
the trial court's decision to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements
of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation . . . . "
See Morgan, 288 P.3d at 838 (emphasis from original). However, as demonstrated
supra, the information barred from the record in this case was germane to that decision.
Thus, even
See, e.g., Chavez, 134 Idaho 312; Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320.
under Morgan's unique definition of "the entire record.'' the transcripts sought by
Mr. Thompson needed to be augmented, lest he be denied due process of law in
violation of Constitution.
2
The State also invokes Morgan's "failed to demonstrate" language in response to
Mr. Thompson's assertions regarding effective assistance of counsel. (Resp. Br., p.13
("[Mr.] Thompson, like Morgan, 'has failed to demonstrate how effective assistance of
counsel is not possible without the requested transcripts.'").) However, because the
transcripts were mistakenly made available, Mr. Thompson is able to demonstrate how
he could be deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Appellate counsel is ethically
obligated to "make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in supporl of
the best arguments to be made." LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1997)
(emphasis added); see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 742-43 (1967). As
Mr. Thompson demonstrated in the Renewed Motion, there was evidence of mitigation
presented at those hearings. Because that evidence is not included in the appellate
record, counsel's argument that the district court insufficiently considered the mitigating
factors in this case when it revoked Mr. Thompson's probation in an abuse of discretion
is deprived of supporting facts. As such, counsel's brief may not have been in support
of the best arguments to be made. Were that the case, Mr. Thompson would be
deprived of effective assistance of counsel in violation of his constitutional rights.
6

Having established the relevancy of these transcripts, the burden shifts to the
State to prove that the transcripts were not necessary to the appellate record. It has not
fulfilled that burden. Rather, its arguments assert procedural rules to try and justify a
violation of Mr. Thompson's constitutional rights:

he could have re-presented that

evidence at other hearings, which were transcribed (Resp. Br., pp.10-11 ), the same
facts appear elsewhere in the record (Resp. Br., p.11), and district court judges will not
go back and listen to potentially-relevant hearings in their preparation to determine
whether to revoke jurisdiction. 3 (Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) As an initial matter, compliance
with a state procedural rule will not shield the State when there has been a violation of a
constitutional right.

Matthews v. Jones, 147 Idaho 224, 231 (Ct. App. 2009).

In this

(See App. Br., pp.14-16.) Therefore, because of the specific facts of this case, the
State's argument in this regard fails.
3
The State grossly mischaracterizes Mr. Thompson's assertions in this regard.
(Compare App. Br., pp.8-9 with Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) Mr. Thompson asserted that
"a diligent district court judge would review the file, as well as any potentially-relevant
audio hearings, if he could not remember what he had heard at those prior hearings, in
order to sufficiently consider the evidence before ruling on the sentencing issues."
(App. Br., pp.8-9.) Evident in that statement is Mr. Thompson's recognition that such a
review is not always necessary, but also evident is his assertion that the possibility of
such a review demonstrates the relevance of such prior hearings. See, e.g., Downing v.
State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001) (permitting a district court to rely on its
own observations during the evolution of a case).
However, the State twists Mr. Thompson's statement into a full-blown contention
that all district courts must listen to the recording of every prior hearing before it hears
additional arguments. (Resp. Br., pp.11 ("[Mr.] Thompson's suggestion that the district
court was required to sua sponte listen to "potentially-relevant audio hearings [sic]" and
ascertain whether [Mr.] Thompson previously presented some mitigating evidence ..
. 'l) The State then attacks that argument, as if that were really what Mr. Thompson
were asserting. (Resp. Br., pp.11-12).
In doing so, the State completely missed the point of Mr. Thompson's argument:
because the district court may conduct such a review (though it may not be necessary)
the information therein is germane to the district court's decision regarding probation
revocation. As such, it is improper and contrary to the Constitution to exclude such
relevant information from the appellate record.
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case, depriving Mr. Thompson of a sufficient appellate record by refusing to augment
that record with relevant and germane transcripts violates his broadly-construed
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. 4 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971);
Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 630, 636 (1967); State v. Martinez, 92 Idaho 148, 149-50

(1968); State v. Zielinski, 119 Idaho 316,318 (1991).

Therefore, adhering to a

procedural rule, such as whether Mr. Thompson could have (though he does not
concede that he needed to

he has the prerogative to choose which procedural

mechanism to use to ensure an adequate record) made this request pursuant to I.AR.
29(a) rather than I.AR 30

Resp. Br., p.13), does not justify denying him an

adequate appellate record. See, e.g., Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18; Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636;
Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50; Zielinski, 119 Idaho at 318.

Additionally, in regard to the State's claims that Mr. Thompson should
have re-presented this mitigation evidence at other hearings and that the record
contains the same facts elsewhere actually demonstrate the absurdity of the State's
attempts to justify the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to not augment the record.
Either Mr. Thompson must waste the district court's time rehashing and re-presenting

4

Whether or not the Idaho Supreme Court expressly declared its intent to deprive
Mr. Thompson of an adequate record because of his indigency is irrelevant, even
though the State seems to believe that the Court must declare its intention to violate the
Constitution on the record. (Resp. Br., p.13 (quoting Morgan, 288 P.3d at 839, to argue
that, because other procedural mechanisms were available, the denial was not due to
indigency).)
Rather, the Equal Protection Clause protects against "invidious
discriminations" (i.e., the appearance of unfairness based on economic means).
See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18. In this case, by saying the indigent defendant cannot get a
transcript because he used one procedural mechanism as opposed to another creates
an invidious discrimination which is rooted in his economic means, thus violating the
Equal Protection Clause. See id.
8

evidence or he must guess which hearings are going to be transcribed, present all his
evidence at that time, and hope that the evidence will be included in his appellate
record.

Furthermore, since the district court is permitted to rely on its recollections of

the evidence already presented in the case (and since a diligent district court will
presumably refresh its memory of the facts and proceedings of a case before ruling on
the issues therein), there is no reason to force a defendant to rehash evidence already
being considered by the district court.

See Downing, 136 Idaho at 373-74 (regarding

the scope of what the district court may rely upon). Such evidence is already relevant to
the subsequent appeal and should be augmented to tile record.
However, if the appellate record is limited to just the bare facts which might be
elsewhere in the record, the appellate court is not actually reviewing the same
information considered by the district court.

Notably, it loses the context and the

dynamics of the evidence and testimony being presented.

For example, at the

disposition hearing held on November 16, 2011, the record only states that "Defendant
makes statement."

(39515 R., p.160.)

That statement actually considered by the

district court consisted of various statements in mitigation:
Your Honor, I have wrote the letter. I'm just going to say a few
more things. I messed up. I got off the first rider, I mean I was 19, I was
young. I didn't pay as much attention as I should have. But I was
released from my rider and I did amazing. I mean I got married, I had a
good life, I had a good job. Everything was wonderful. I mean I still had it
my head that I didn't have a problem. I was young, you know, I thought
that it would just be a while and then I can be like normal people and drink
like normal people.
Well, I was released on unsupervised probation which, you know, I
brought it to my own head thinking that I was never going to have a
probation officer any more so I started drinking again. Almost immediately
I lost my wife, she broke up with me. I never lived on my own before, so it
was all a complete change. I mean my wife was always there to do
everything for me, the only thing I really had to do was go to work, and she
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took care of a bills, she took care of everything. She helped me tell me - she was there to tell me that -- when I was messing up, you know, she
was there to say to get my head back on straight, I guess, and I listened to
her.
\/Veil, when we separated I didn't really have anybody there to kind
of guide me anymore, so I didn't know what to do. I started -- I quit paying
rent, I started drinking very heavily. My life went completely out of control.
I mean I got addicted to Xanax and my life just completely went out of
control until this day I had gotten in trouble and got another felony.
I went on another rider which the second rider I -- I mean I know
traditional riders supposed to be called a treatment center, but to me, I
mean, what I got out of this rider is like work ethics. I mean I got my OSHA
card, I got NCC
card. I got certain things but I just didn't take it for a
drug and alcohol treatment center myself, I guess. I guess I just didn't get
the picture, and also I never actually got to live what I was learning, you
know, so I got I'm the type of person that things go in one ear and out
the other, like I can't memorize a lot of stuff, and, you know, live by it, I
guess.
I believe this program, they are going to help me learn while I'm
actually doing. I mean I'll have a steady job, I'll learn to live on my own
instead of not knowing what I'm going to do. I mean I got off this time, I got
off my traditional rider and almost immediately I didn't have nowhere to go,
I had to live with my sisters for about a week, and I ended up getting
kicked out of there by my probation officer because of my felony and it
was an apartment that is low income. So I met this girl I knew her for
about a week and my probation officer allowed me to move in with her. I
thought it was good at first and almost immediately I realized that she was
a drinker.
And then my divorce became final, I found out over Facebook, and
it really -- I mean I didn't even know I signed divorce papers until that day,
and everything came crashing down. My life kind of went crazy. I didn't
have no structure. I didn't do nothing. I stayed at home. I didn't have a life
at all. I wasn't -- I didn't have any work, I wasn't really out looking for work
which was my fault. But I couldn't -- I couldn't come to it I didn't know -- I
was completely lost when I was released. I didn't know what to do. I had
no support. I was surrounding myself by people that -- by family, some
family that was using, drinking. I didn't have no stable environment at all,
your Honor.
I have read a lot about the Freedom Place, I believe that it's exactly
what I need to, you know, at least a good chance to have a normal life. If
I'm sent to prison, I don't see what would -- how it's going to help me. I
mean I know I made mistakes in my life, I have a bad drinking problem, I
have a bad addiction. I don't want to ever drink again in my life. I know that
if I continue, ifs going to end up killing me -- or well, it's going to end up
doing something very bad to me. I don't know what else to do. I know -- I
know what prison does to some -- to people and it's never a good thing. I'd
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be lost in prison. I wouldn't have nothing and I believe if I was released -or after release of prison, I'd be back to where I'm at right now. I would get
out, I would have nowhere to go, my life would be uncontrollable still
because I wouldn't have any structure.
With this year program, I have it all, I'll have a job, I will be going I'll find God, I mean that's one thing I have never been much of a church
person but I pray all the time, I have been trying to read the bible myself,
I'm totally nieve [sic] about it, and I really want to learn. I want to know -- I
mean I tried everything I can think of to stay sober and I need to figure
something else out and I believe this program is absolutely what I need. I
mean I don't know what else to say.
If I can be given this chance like they said, there's all these
stipulations, if I mess up once, I'm gone, maybe - I'm willing to do
anything. I'm willing to do anything I can in order to be there for my
daughter. I'm willing to -- I want it for myself. I know, like I said, I know that
I can't live if I continue to drink. I feel healthier now than I have ever really
felt. I feel really positive about everything. My life seems to be going better
to myself. I have been a trustee for a couple months, I work my butt off as
a trustee, and I need this chance, your Honor.
(Tr., p.100, L.22 - p.105, L.11.)

The difference in the statements is obvious:

one

indicates only that a statement was made; the other provides the courts with various
explanations relevant to Mr. Thompson's character and whether society requires
protection from him achieved only through incarceration, and therefore, evidence
relevant to the ultimate question decided by the district court which is now on appeal.
See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312. As indicated in the Renewed Motion, Mr. Thompson

made other statements at other points, highlighting and explaining other mitigating
factors, all of which were relevant to the district court's decision in this regard.
See Downing, 136 Idaho at 373-74. Therefore, the State's assertion that the record is

somehow sufficient without those explanations is erroneous.

(Compare, e.g., 39515

R., p.160 with Tr., p.100, L.22- p.105, L.11.)

Because all the State's procedural arguments fail to justify the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision, and do not demonstrate that the relevant information contained in the
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absent transcripts is not necessary to Mr. Thompson's appeal, it has failed to meet its
burden, and this Court should fashion appropriate relief. 5
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Thompson's Probation Or,
Alternatively, By Not Reducing His Sentence Sua Sponte Pursuant To Idaho Criminal
Rule 35

Because the State's argument concerning the district court's decisions when it
revoked Mr. Thompson's probation is not remarkable, no further reply is necessary.
Accordingly, Mr. Thompson simply refers the Court back to pages 16-23 of his
Appellant's Brief.

5

In the event this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, it is not being asked to
overturn a decision made by the Idaho Supreme Court. Rather, it is being asked to
recognize the violation of Mr. Thompson's constitutional rights and grant him relief
accordingly. For example, that relief might be to presume the absent transcripts weigh
in favor of Mr. Thompson's claims and do demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the
district court, and thus, he is entitled to be released on probation or have his case
remanded for a new determination in that regard.
Obviously, given the fact that Mr. Thompson's sentence was suspended upon
the district court's review of the factors considered at those hearings, the district court
must have determined the mitigating factors in the record then outweighed all the
aggravating factors, and thus, release was appropriate. See, e.g., Charboneau, 124
Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521. As such, providing a remedy of presumption in favor of
release, when combined with the additional mitigating evidence presented at the rider
review hearing, demonstrates the abuse of the district court's discretion and justifies
relief.
To that point, the State's contention - "If anything, that Thompson performed well
during the retained jurisdiction program demonstrates that incarceration is precisely
what is appropriate to address Thompson's compliance issues." (Resp. Br., p.16) - is
directly contrary to the purpose of the rider programs, which is provide the district court
with additional time and information, upon which it can better assess the defendant's
potential to rehabilitate and succeed on probation. See State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135,
137 (2001); State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203,
205 (Ct. App. 1990). As such, the State's erroneous assertion should be rejected by
this Court.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Thompson respectfully requests that this Court afford him the necessary
relief for the violations of his state and federal constitutional rights during the appellate
process. Otherwise, he respectfully requests that the order revoking his probation and
executing the sentences be vacated and the case remanded for a new disposition
hearing. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2013.

BRIAN R. DIC
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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